V5S 



Digitized by the Internet Archive 
in 2010 with funding from 
The Library of Congress 



http://www.archive.org/details/americanpolicyinOOweit 



iIH CONORESS I 

1st Session f 



SENATE 



DocuMRNr 
No. 334 



AMERICAN POLICY IN 
NICARAGUA 



MEMORANDUM 



CONVENTION BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 

NICARAGUA RELATIVE TO AN INTEROCEANIC 

CANAL AND A NAVAL STATION IN THE 

GULF OF FONSECA, SIGNED AT 

MANAGUA, NICARAGUA, ON 

FEBRUARY 8, 1913 



GEORGE T. WEITZEL 

FORMER AMERICAN MINISTER TO NICARAGUA, 1912-13 




PRESENTED BY MR. LODGE 
FEBRUARY 19, 1916.— Ordered to be printed 



WASHINGTON 

GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 

1916 






(\ 




D. of Do 
WAR H 1916 



w 



,^a^ 



AMEBirAN POLiry IN jNICARAGUA. 



MeraoraiKlum hy George T. Weitzel, former minister to Nicaragua, 1912-13. 

The necessity for putting an end to the constant disorders in Cen- 
tral America and thereby removing the liability of European inter- 
ference in those republics has been generally recognized, and numer- 
ous plans have been proposed to bring about such a happy result. 
For many years the United States was content with making mere 
representations to the belligerents or expressing " grave concern " for 
the safety of its citizens ; then naval vessels were sent to the troubled 
regions to look out for the protection of any Americans or foreigners 
that might be within reach of their guns, or to protest occasionally 
against barbarities committed by the combatants, but more often to 
carry away the vanquished chiefs in order to save them from execu- 
tion by their victorious enemies. A further step in the interest of 
peace was taken when the belligerents were invited aboard these 
vessels to discuss and compose their differences with the friendly 
counsel of naval and diplomatic officers of the United States; and 
inasmuch as it was believed to be desirable to have the cooperation 
of a Latin- American country, Mexico was later invited to participate 
on such occasions, iln these circumstafices a conference was held in 
July, 1906, on board the U. S. S. Marhlehead, attended by represen- 
tatives of the Central American Republics, for the purpose of dis- 
cussing terms of peace, with the aid of the good offices of American 
and Mexican diplomatic agents. Among the stipulations of the 
treaty signed on the Marblehead was one requiring that all future 
differences should be submitted to the arbitration of the Presidents 
of the United States and of Mexico. The terms of the treaty were 
not observed, and the two Presidents were accordingly called upon 
by Guatemala to arbitrate a controversy between Honduras and 
Nicaragua, but before they could take action Zelaya, the President of 
Nicaragua, ousted the Government of Honduras, established a friendly 
candidate in office, and thus closed the matter for the time being. 

The first systematic and well-considered effort to seek a remedy 
for the disorders in Central America was made by President Roose- 
velt in the Washington peace conventions of 1907, which were nego- 
tiated by delegates representing all five Republics, who met under the 
joint auspices of the United States and Mexico, though neither of the 
latter Governments was a signatory of the treaties. The most im- 
portant of the stipulations are those providing for the neutralization 
of Honduras; for the prevention of the use of the territory of one 
State to incite or aid insurrectioi) in another; and for the establish- 
ment of a (^entrai American court of justice at Cartago, Costa Rica, 
to settle all controversies. Uufortiiuatelv no method was then 



4 AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGL'A, 

thought of or has since been devised to compel observance of the stipu- 
lations, and as a consequence they have been frequently violated. 
Each of the States, in turn, complained of aggressions by the others, 
and all of them appealed to the United States and Mexico for the 
interposition of their good offices. In the summer of 1909 no less 
than six American and two Mexican gunboats, on request of the sev- 
eral Eepublics, patroled the Atlantic and Pacific coasts of Central 
America in an effort to intercept filibustering expeditions and to pre- 
serve some semblance of order. The principal offender was Presi- 
dent Zelaya, of Nicaragua, who was not only disturbing the peace of 
the neighboring Eepublics, but also attempting to control or abolish 
the Cartago court. 

The conventions may therefore be said to have failed of their pur- 
pose, except in so far as they have committed the Central American 
countries to certain definite principles and to the recognition of the 
interest of the United States in the settlement of their affairs. Presi- 
dent Roosevelt is entitled to the credit for being the first to seek the 
cooperation of a Latin- American Government in the settlement of a 
Latin-American problem, and it was no fault of the United States 
that difficulty arose as soon as it became necessary to put into practice 
the theory of united action. When the Government at Washington, 
under the following administration, proposed that the two Powers 
should cooperate to guarantee the neutrality of Honduras and com- 
pel observance of the conventions, Mexico replied that it was unwill- 
ing to go so far, as it had no interest, commercial or political, to 
justif}^ interference, excei)t in the bordering State of Guatemala. 
President Porfirio Diaz, frankly admitting his obligation to Zelaya, 
said he did not wish to do anything to embarrass his friend, but he 
gave in advance an indorsement of whatever the United States might 
see fit to do south of Guatemala. This virtually brought an end to 
the cooperative efforts, and thereafter the United States pursued its 
policy alone. 

Conditions in Nicaragua and Honduras became so intolerable that 
the better class of people in both countries appealed to the United 
States in the name of humanity to intervene to restore order. It is a 
debatable question whether this Government would not have acted 
wisely to accept the invitation and to ha^e done for Nicaragua what 
it did for Cuba. The justification for such a course was certainly as 
urgent, and prompt and thorough action would have settled the 
Central American problem once for all. However, nothing was done 
until in December, 1909, on the occasion of the killing of two Amer- 
icans by order of Zelaya, the United States withdrew its recognition 
of him and broke off diplomatic relations. This was sufficient to 
cause his downfall and flight from the country, and the overthrow 
of his representative in Honduras. 

The time then seemed favorable for making another attempt to 
solve the Central American problem, and therefore the Department of 
State determined to try to reach the difficulty by reorganization of the 
finances of both countries. Accordingly, a loan convention was signed 
in 1911, first with Honduras and then with Nicaragua. These fol- 
lowed the plan originally worked out by the Roosevelt administra- 
tion in 1907 in the Dominican Republic. The theory back of it was 
to prevent disorders by taking away the principal financial incentive 



AMERICAN POLICY IX KICAKAGUA. 5 

to revolution, namel}^, control of the customshouses. It involved 
simply the refunding of the public debt and payment of all foreign 
obligations bv means of a loan obtained in the United States and 
secured by the customs revenues collected under the supervision of 
an American, and thus removed from likelihood of seizure by revo- 
lutionists. This plan worked with such success in Santo Domingo 
that the trade of that country increased within a short period of 
years almost threefold; and the augmented revenue, by reason of 
honest and efficient collection, not only adequately provided for the 
governmental needs but yielded a positive surplus actually greater 
in amount than the total revenue of the State prior to the initiation 
of the new system. So that with no risk to ourselves we showed how 
the confusecl finances of a country could be placed on a sound basis 
of credit, and peace thereby maintained through our generous action 
without imposing an unnecessary or unwelcome interference. 

This financial plan, as applied to Nicaragua, was embodied in 
the Knox-Castrillo loan conventi(m, signed at "Washington, June 6, 
1911, which fallowed closely the successful Dominican measure. It 
was promptly passed by the Nicaraguan National Assembly, but met 
with opposition in the United States, and a motion to report it but 
of the Senate committee was lost by a tie vote in May, 1912. Two 
months later a revolution broke out in Managua, headed by Gen. Mena, 
minister of war, who, taking advantage of his cabinet position, not 
only in violation of his oath of office but also of his written pledge 
to the United States and its minister, made a treacherous attempt 
to seize the Government, after the manner of Gen. Huerta, in Mexico, 
but without success, as the insurrection was eventually put down by 
the president, Adolfo Diaz. 

In the absence of the Senate approval of the treaty, the United 
States Government did not assume any responsibilty in connection 
with the administration of Nicaraguan customs revenues. However, 
the Government at Managua, while Avaiting for ratification, entered 
September 1, 1911, into a purely private arrangement of a tempo- 
rary nature with American bankers in order to obtain funds urgentlj'^ 
needed until the large loan contemplated bj^ the treaty should become 
available. As securit}^ for the temporary loan, which amounted to 
$1,500,000, the Nicaraguan Government pledged its customs receipts 
and agreed that they should be collected by a collector general, nomi- 
nated by the bankers and approved by the Secretary of State. The 
proceeds of the loan were used to reform the currency; to retire the 
depreciated paper; to put the country on a gold-exchange basis; to 
establish a national bank; and to pay at least a pro rata on indemnity 
claims, which would be adjusted by a mixed-claims commission, 
composed of two American judges and one Nicaraguan. The com- 
mission, by a special law of Nicaragua, was also given power to pass 
on the status and vaJidity of all concessions granted under previous 
administrations. 

This temporary plan has worked successfully, notAvithstanding 
embarrassments caused by the Mena revolution, but it suffers from 
all the disadvantages of a makeshift measure. The Nicaraguan Gov- 
ernment is being constantly prodded by the English and German 
Governments for the payment of alleged claims; it needs at least 
ten or tAvelve million dollars to refund its European debt of about 



g AMEBIC AN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 

five millions, and internal obligations and claims of another four 
millions, not to mention additional sums for railroad construction, 
education, and public works. This large loan can not be obtained on 
favorable terms without some sort of treaty which will guarantee 
peace and order in Nicaragua, as no one is willing to invest any con- 
siderable amount in a country of constant disorders. As there seems 
only slight prospect that the Knox-Castrillo convention will be ap- 
proved by the Senate, some other arrangement will apparently have 
to be devised. 

A new plan, embodied in the canal treaty, which was negotiated 
by Secretary Knox and signed by the American minister at Managua, 
February 8, 1913, proceeds on a different theory from all the pre- 
ceding measures. Unlike the Washington peace conventions it re- 
gards Nicaragua, because of important strategic considerations, 
rather than Honduras, as the State to be neutralized and pacified; 
and it differs materially from the Knox-Castrillo loan convention in 
that it treats the financial confusion of the country as only one of 
the^ elements of danger that must be remedied, and seeks to eradicate 
a more deeply seated source of trouble. 

A careful examination of the early and recent history of Nicaragua 
will show that the numerous disorders, revolutions, and foreign com- 
plications may be more or less directly traced to one cause, aruJ that 
if any permanent peace is to come to that portion of the continent 
this cause must be removed..^ All of these disturbances, however 
confusing and unrelated they may seem, are to be classified under 
three general heads as international, interstate, and internal. 

First. By international disputes are meant those with countries 
other than the neighboring republics. In early times, when Central 
America was yet a^ colony and Spain was engaged in warfare with 
England, France, and Holland, the territory of Nicaragua, on ac- 
count of its strategic position between the two seas near the center 
of the narrow isthmus which connects the northern and the southern 
continents, suffered enormously from the depredations of British, 
French, and Dutch pirates drawn thither because of the easy means 
of communication between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, both of 
which they were searching for the gold-bearing galleons of Spain. 
In 1780 a young sea captain, who afterwards became the great Ad- 
miral Lord Nelson, perceiving in an early stage of his genius the 
importance of the territory, attempted to win for his sovereign 
control of the Nicaraguan canal route, and at the head of a naval 
expedition began the ascent of the San Juan Eiver, but was com- 
pelled by illness to give up the effort after a bitter contest with the 
combined forces of Spaniards and Indians. Even after Nicaragua 
became an independent republic it continued to be an object of atten- 
tion by the maritime nations of Europe. England seized the port 
of San Juan del Norte, on the Atlantic, in 1848 ; took possession of 
Tigre Island, in the Gulf of Fonseca, in 1849; and claimed the whole 
of the eastern coast as a protectorate, this latter pretension not being 
given up until 1894, during the Cleveland administration. The fol- 
lowing year British warships occupied the port of Corinto in order 
to collect a claim of indemnity. Similar demands, it will be remem- 
bered, served as the pretext of the ill-fated attempt of the third 
Napoleon to establish Maximilian's empire in Mexico, which had for 
one of its objects the extension of his power to include the boundaries 
of Nicaragua. 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 7 

There exists in the New World — 

he wrote with unrestrained enthusiasm — 

a State as admirably situated as Constantinople, and we must say up to this 
time as uselessly occupied. We allude to the State of Nicaragua. As Constan- 
tinople is the center of the ancient world, so is the town of Leon the center of the 
new, and if the tongue of land which separates its two lakes from the Pacific 
Ocean were cut through, she would command by virtue of her central position the 
entire coast of North and South America. The State of Nicaragua can become, 
better than Constantinople, the necessary route of the great commerce of the 
world, and is destined to attain an extraordinary degree of prosperity and 
grandeur. 

The union of Nicaragua with Mexico was not original with Napo- 
leon, as the annexation of the whole of Central America to the so-called 
Mexican Empire had already been once forcibly accomplished by 
Iturbide in 1823, and continued to be the ideal of some of the succes- 
sors of that ruler until recent years, when the United States was called 
upon to protect Central America from Mexican encroachment. 

The southern as well as the northern neighbor of Central America 
has entertained an ambition to secure control of Nicaragua. The 
Republic of Colombia, basing its action on what Nicaragua alleged 
was a long- forgotten and invalid decree of a Spanish monarch, set up 
a claim, in September, 1880, to the entire Atlantic coast of Central 
America as far north as Cape Gracias, the apparent purpose being to 
frustrate the negotiations which were then going on between the 
United States and Nicaragua, and which eventually culminated in 
the signing of the Frelinghuysen-Zavala canal treaty. Colombia fol- 
lowed up its formal communication on the subject by preparing, some 
years later, to send forces to seize Great Corn Island, at the eastern 
entrance to the proposed canal, but President Cleveland, desirous of 
preventing hostilities between the two sister Eepublics, dispatched 
the U. S. S. Boston to the scene of disputed jurisdiction with instruc- 
tions to continue to recognize the established authority. 

In all of these cases of Nicaraguan international controversies with 
Europe, Mexico, and Colombia the real cause of the trouble was the 
desire to control the interoceanic canal route. 

Second. By interstate disputes are meant those which relate to 
the Central American Republics exclusively. Nicaragua and the 
other four countries— Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, and Costa 
Rica — were organized in 1823 in a federation called the " United 
Provinces of Central America." From its inception there was con- 
stant turmoil, due to the jealousies of the several component States 
and to the rivalries of their respective leaders. Guatemala and Sal- 
vador engaged in a bitter warfare, the unhappy results of which may be 
seen even at the present day. The suffering from the chronic disorders 
and anarchy became so intolerable that the people of Salvador, de- 
sirous of peace (they had petitioned the United States to be annexed, 
during the troubles with the Mexican Empire), seceded from the 
Central American Union. Its action was followed by Costa Rica, 
the federation dissolved, and its last president, Morazan, was cap- 
tured and executed. Numerous efforts have since been made with- 
out success to restore the union, notably in 1851 and 1863, not to 
mention Zelaj^a's many futile schemes. The most daring attempt, 
however, was undertaken in 1885 by Gen. Rufino Barrios, President 
and dictator of Guatemala, who sought to put his plan into effect be- 
fore the ratification of the Frelinghuysen-Zavala canal treaty which 



8 AMEEICAN POLICY IIST NICARAGUA. 

had been signed by the United States and Nicaragua. A period of 
bloody warfare seemed unavoidable and was averted only by the 
death of Barrios who was unexpectedly^ slain in battle with the 
Salvadorans. 

In a word, most of the conflicts among the Central American States 
have resulted from the ambition of the most powerful dictators to 
impose their rule on the adjacent countries and gradually to em- 
brace them all for the ostensible purpose of reestablishing the 
union, but with the real object of controlling the canal route across 
Nicaragua. 

Third. By internal disputes are meant those which concern the 
people of Nicaragua alone. These may, for the most part, be as- 
cribed to the bitter hostility between the cities of Granada and Leon 
and to their bloody struggles for supremacj^ the germs of which 
are said to be traceable back to pre-Colombian times. In colonial 
days Leon was the capital, the seat of a bishopric, and the site of 
a garrison, and as such had become the residence of the civil, re- 
ligious, and military authorities sent from Spain to govern the coun- 
try ._ _ On the other hand, Granada, by virtue of its advantageous 
position at the head of the great lake, which at one time could 
be visited by light-draft vessels from the Atlantic, grew to be the 
center of the trade and wealth of the colonj^, and this nobility class, 
as it called itself, being denied any voice in the government at Leon, 
raised the cry of independence. Even after separation from Spain 
in 1821 their mutual antagonism did not cease, and for more than 
30 years following the organization of the Federal Republic of 
Central America, Nicaragua remained in a constant condition of 
anarchy, with a succession of brawling governments, against which 
mutiny at Leon alternated with treason at Granada, both cities being 
several times partially destroyed, each in turn supporting or oppos- 
ing the federation whenever such action gave promise of gaining for 
it the ascendancy over its eiiemy, until finally both deqjared for seces- 
sion in order to fight out their differences without interruption by 
the central authority. 

For similar reasons they took opposing sides on the canal question, 
and when the acquisition of California made the construction of an 
interoceanic route across the isthmus a matter of economic as well as 
political importance for the United States, Granada, as the champion 
of commercial development in Nicaragua, favored the enterprise, 
while Leon, though friendly to the United States, as the better class 
of its people has always been, continued to oppose any measures that 
would supposedly contribute to the advaiitage of its rival. So popu- 
lar, however, was the canal idea, and so strong the ^ntiment for 
trade development and for encouraging our assistance, that beginning 
in 1858 and continuing for 35 years the Granada faction controlled 
the Government, and by observing the constitutional requirements 
and electing a series of able Presidents, gave Nicaragua a long era of 
peace, which is without parallel in Central America, and which at 
last, because of local dissensions, was brought to an end in 1893 by 
Zelaya, who opposed canal construction under American auspices. 

In brief, it may be said that the canal question is the principal 
disturbing issue in Nicaraguan affairs, whether international, inter- 
state, or internal; and this is none the less true, even though the 



• AMERR'AN POLICY IX NICARAGUA. 9 

Panama I'oiite has long since been chosen as the worhl's high\\ay of 
commerce. It still offers to the cupiditj^ of the professional revolu- 
tionist a prize as valuable as the possession of the customhouses 
and affords as much as ever an opportunity for intrigues among the 
Central American Eepublics and a basis for negotiation with for- 
eign countries, if not a provocation for their interference in the 
affairs of Nicaragua. Thus in June, 1910, according to % consular 
report, the executive delegate of Zelaya proposed to the British min- 
ister at Guatemala, through an agent, that in consideration of Eng- 
lish intervention and protest against alleged illegal interference by 
the United States, which, he declared, prevented the restoration of 
order and was therefore prejudicial to the interests of British sub- 
jects domiciled on the Atlantic coast, the Nicaraguan Government 
would cede Great Corn Island to Great Britain for a coaling sta- 
tion. Perhaps no better light can be thrown on this aspect of the 
matter and of the way in which the canal question was treated by 
a certain faction of the Leon liberals when in control of the Govern- 
ment than by the quotation of several paragraphs of an instruction 
addressed by Zelaj^'a's m.inister of foreign affairs to the Nicaraguan 
minister at Paris on April 29. 1908, as shown by the official archives 
in Managua : 

Yoii no doubt are aware of the tnni of the iiolioy of the Republic of Colombia 
with relation to Panama and the United States, chiefly in regard to the 
opening of the canal, tending at present to make closer their relations with 
Japan ariji^ showing overtly their intentions to enter formally into negotiations 
having t(^do with the canal south of the Panama Canal and to induce Japanese 
Immigrafion into their territory, etc. 

We are well acQuainted with the desires of aggrandizement of the Japanese 
Empire and the spirit of the Government of Colombia, which never will 
forget the secession of its important department, influenced by the United 
States, and which in its excited desire to win back what it has lost grasps at any 
project whatsoever which is otfered to it as a realization of its hopes. In 
view of this it is not impossible that what is now considered doubtful may 
later be consummated if possible obstacles do not interfere. 

Nicaragua can not remain indifferent before such eventualities. As you 
know positively the canal through our country offers at all times various ad- 
vantages over that of Panama, and that it was international policy which re- 
solved the selection of this last-mentioned route ; also, that the present proposal 
of the Colombians presents innumerable disadvantages. 

But even withdrawing from this point of view and supposing, as is most 
likely, that in the end the Panama Canal will be the only Ciinal, yet we have 
to take into account that the United States fears, and rightly, that another or 
other powers may render null and void a great part of their tremendous labor. 
And in this sense it is indubitable that Colombia or Nicaragua may obtain no 
inconsiderable political advantage from the insecure or be it false position in 
which the United States finds itself. 

Now, through the instrumentality of a certain English consul to this coun- 
try who may be well informed in the premises we have learned that Great 
Britain and Japan have lately concerted the idea of the canal by way of 
Nicaragua. * * * 

It is my wish, therefore, that you, in an absolutely personal character and 
with the greatest possible care and discretion, should talk with the Japanese am- 
bassador in Paris, saying that, although you are not in possession of instructions 
from your Government to the effect, you would venture if the Government of 
Japan should send agents to Nicaragua the overtures which they might make 
in connection with this important matter would be very well received. All 
this without putting on paper a single word of your conversations. 

You are not to forget that this matter is of the utmost confidence, for as you 
will plainly understand that if the United States were prematurely to get wind 
of our proceedings, whatever we might do in the matter would cost us dear. 



10 AMERICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. «. 

If success is ours we shall procure at the very least most enviable political 
advantages, above all greater consideration and respect from the United States, 
and it may be an enviable position in respect to Central America. 

The Chamorro-Weitzel treaty, as the Knox measure signed at 
Managua is called, has been drawn on the theory that it would 
not only set at rest for all time the control of the canal route, and 
thus remgve it from being a possible cause of international complica- 
tions, but also that it will afford a solution of the interstate question 
of a Central American Union, and tend to allay the internal troubles 
growing out of the animosities between Leon and Granada. 

By the treaty a perpetual and exclusive option is conceded to the 
United States to build an interoceanic canal across the territory of 
Nicaragua, the details and terms of the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of such canal being left for determination later by 
mutual consultation between the two Governments and until such 
time as the actual construction should be decided upon. There is fur- 
ther granted to the United States the right to maintain a naval sta- 
tion in the Gulf of Fonseca, should this be deemed expedient, and the 
lease for 99 years of Great and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean; 
and to stimulate commerce it is provided that American ships shall 
enjoy the privileges of Nicaragua coastwise trade. In consideration 
of the foregoing the United States Government undertakes to pay 
$3,000,000, in trust, to be used for general education, public works, 
and for the advancement of the welfare of Nicaragua, all disburse- 
ments being made subject to the joint supervision of the secretary of 
state at Washington and the minister of finance in Managua. 

The benefits to Nicaragua, besides the cash payments, are the 
guaranty of the peace and independence of the Republic, the develop- 
ment of its great resources through capital drawn to the country, 
the prospect that some day the canal may be constructed, and finally 
the removal of a constant incentive to disorders. Corresponding ad- 
vantages to the United States are the elimination of foreign political 
influence in Nicaragua, the prevention of any issue arising under 
the Monroe doctrine or the Lodge resolution, the service of a caveat 
against any more canal concessions or territorial privileges, and the 
preparation for the future growth of our coastwise commerce by 
shortening the interoceanic route. Furthermore, an American naval 
station in the Bay of Fonseca, the safest and most strategic harbor 
on the Pacific south of San Francisco, would be not only an impor- 
tant element in the defense of the Panama Canal but would also, 
through the power of publicity thus given to Central American 
affairs, afford the most effective means of guaranteeing the observ- 
vance of the Washington conventions. 

It goes without saying that our policy in Nicaragua as thus out- 
lined has met with criticism. Some of it comes from those who sin- 
cerely but lightly believe that the Central American States should be 
left to the fate which Bismarck so generously suggested for France 
when he said : " Let her cook in her own gravy." There are more- 
over a few critics whose opinions are not of such a negative character, 
and who declare with great positiveness that "vested interests," monop- 
olies, and concessions should not be disturbed by the new order in Nic- 
aragua ; there are others, having European affiliations, who can see no 
good purpose whatsoever in extending American influence on this con- 
tinent : and finally there are the partisans of Zelaya who are loudest 
of all in their complaints, for reasons that will hereinafter appear. 



AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 11 

The criticisms of our policy, so far as they can be ascertained from 
pamphlets and prints of various kinds, are about as follows: (1) That 
the United States to cover its design of ousting Zelaya and the 
Liberals from the Government of Nicaragua made use of the friv- 
olous pretext of seeking redress for the killing of two Americans; 
(2) that Madriz, another Liberal, the successor of Zelaya, was the 
constitutional President and should have been recognized as such by 
the United States; (3) that the conservative Government which 
followed the Zelaya-Madriz regime was corrupt and despotic, and 
the program of financial reorganization for which it Avas sponsor 
worked injustice to Nicaragua; (4) that the landing of marines at 
the time of the Mena revolution was an unprecedented violation of 
territory, and their retention in Managua is the only thing that pre- 
vents the downfall of the Diaz administration; (5) that the Liberals 
are in an overwhelming majority in Nicaragua and would win the 
presidency if guaranteed honest elections under United States super- 
- vision; (6) that at least they are entitled to share in a coalition gov- 
ernment and obtain half the offices; (7) that the pending canal 
treaty is against public interest not only because it is unpopular in 
Nicaragua, but also in that it violates the rights of the other Central 
American States; (8) that the canal treaty is further objectionable 
because it will prevent a union of Central America into a single 
strong republic; (9) that the whole policy of the United States is an 
offense against the sovereignty of Nicaragua and an affront to all 
Latin America. 

These complaints, if founded on a basis of truth and not on a 
mere distortion of facts, which were intended to influence the unin- 
formed for ulterior purposes, would constitute a serious reflection 
on the good faith of the United States ahcj would deserve careful 
consideration and appropriate action. Taking them in order, a brief 
examination may be made of each to determine the merits of the casu. 

The first is that the United States, to cover, its design of ousting 
Zelaya and the Liberal Government in Nicaragua, used as a pretext 
for accomplishing this purpose that it was seeking redress for the 
killing of two Americans, when, as a matter of fact, the latter were 
mere soldiers of fortune, who deserved the treatment they received. 

In reply, it may be said that the United States needed no pretext 
/for its action in taking measures to safeguard American life and 
V' property, for a condition of such barbarism prevtiiled in Nicaragua 
as would have justified absolute intervention on the ground of simple 
humanity, as in Cuba, and the com^Dlete occupation of the conntrv to 
restore order. Instead of taking such thorough action, the Depart- 
ment of State rested content with, giving the Nicaraguan charge 
d'affaires his passports after the facts of the execution had been 
verified. 

The details of that celebrated case, as gathered from the Nica- 
ragua court records, are as follows: In October, 1909, a revolution 
against Zelaya, then president, of Nicaragua, was proclaimed by 
Juan Estrada at Bluefields. Two Americans, Cannon and Groce, 
joined the revolutionists, and were commissioned as officers. Both 
had suffered from Zelaya's persecution, and as one was a civil engi- 
neer and the other an experienced miner, they together with a man 
named Couture, a French citizen, were put in charge of the work 
of defending the Unii Junn River by submarine mines against expe- 



12 AMEKiCAJSr rOIJCY IN NICARAGUA. 

ditions sent from the capital to the Atlantic coast. In the course of 
their operations the three men became lost in the forest, and after 
wandering several da3^s gave themselves up to the opposing forces 
as prisoners of war. Zelaya at once ordered a summary court mar- 
tial, and issued strict commands that they be not allowed to com- 
municate with any one. To prevent notice of their plight reaching 
the public, and to forestall any interference by American naval ves- 
sels, the prisoners were removed from Greytown on the coast to an 
inland village, and within 40 minutes of their arrival put on trial. 
They were charged with exploding mines, but the records were 
afterwards doctored so as to make it appear that thej^ had been 
convicted of " rebellion," whatever that may mean. Even though 
nobody had been injured by their alleged oifense, the two Americans 
were condemned to death and the Frenchman given a year in jail. 
Zelaya evidently considered it a much more serious offense to be an 
American than to be a Frenchman. 

The United States consul at Managua, hearing at 2 a. m. of the 
plight of his fellow countrymen, connnunicated with Zelaya. and 
asked that the execution be delayed until he could make an exami- 
nation of the case and report it to the department. Zelaya replied 
at 2 p. m. that he knew nothing of the matter but would investigate. 
He had already determined to frustrate any action by the United 
States, and two hours before, at 12.11 noon, had sent a telegram 
•ordering that the sentence should be carried out at once. The rec- 
ords also show that Gen. Toledo, who was the proper officer to have 
conducted the trial, and, as such, authorized to reduce the sentence, 
telegraphed to Zelnja requesting that the lives of the condemned 
men be spared. This plea for clemency evidently caused the dictator 
to believe that Toledo might endeavor to delay the result, so he sent 
a second telegram at 6.30 p. m. to Gen. Medina, the trial judge, order- 
ing him to proceed with the execution of the two Americans. There 
was still a short delay, because the captain of the firing squad de- 
nounced the proceedings and declined to give the command of exe- 
cution. He was flogged and threatened with death, but resolutely 
refused to carry out the order. Another captain was chosen, the two 
Americans were quickly shot, November 16, and their bodies thrown 
into a ditch. The fiscal, or prosecuting officer, thereupon telegraphed 
the result to Zelaya, and added, " I shall continue to carry out the 
law, and above everything your orders." He was, in truth, carrying 
out " orders," for there is no law, municipal or international, against 
an alien taking arms with either side engaged in Avarf are ; the United 
States welcomed the assistance of foreigners in its own revolution, 
and all civilized nations recognize the principle that such aliens when 
captured must be given the same rights as other prisoners of war. 
Even confessed criminals would have been entitled to greater con- 
sideration than was shown to the two Americans by Zelaya. Their 
summary execution, when the facts Avere made public, aroused the 
greatest indignation throughout the United States. 

A joint resolution was introduced in the Senate December 10, 1909, 
by Senator Eayner, of Maryland, reciting that — 

Whereas the execution of prisoners of war * * * is contrary to the mili- 
tary code of Nicaragua, is in violation of international law, and constitutes 
the crime of murder under every code of military warfare now recognized by 
civilized communities; * * * resolved * * * ^jj^t the President of the 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 13 

United States be, and he is hereby, authorized to take all necessary steps for the 
aijprehension of Zelaya, the alleged perpetrator of the crime, and to bring him 
to trial therefor ; and that he be further authorized to use whatever methods 
and process may l)e necessary to accomplish this purpose. 

The Senator characterized Zelaya as a highwayman, a lyrant, a 
usurper, and an assassin. 

In the school of corruption, dishonor, perfidy, and crime he stands without 
a peer. * * * Now, as the culminating infamy of his administration, tram- 
pling upon every instinct of humanity, in violation of universal l:iw, in defiance 
of those precepts of the international code that have been recognized ever since 
the night of barbarism receded before the rays of civilization, he has put to 
torture and then to death two American citizens. * * * This act was not 
only the act of a fiend, but was an insult to the honor of this Kepul)lic, and can 
not remain unavenged. * * * The proper ctep to take is, therefore, in my 
judgment, that which is embodied in the language of the resolution, and that is, 
by every process and method that may be necessary to apprehend the uuu-derer 
and bring him to trial. This Government is a cowardly Government if it does 
not make an example of Zehiya before the eyes of the civilized world. This 
case will not admit of any trifling or concessions. If two American citizens— 
T care not who they were or what they were; citizens in high standing, as they 
have been reputed to be, or soldiers of fortune — have been murdered by Zelaya, 
then he must be made to pay the penalty of his crime. 

Senator Lodge, of Massachusetts, commenting on his colleague's 
argument, thus expressed himself: 

I am very glad that the Senator from Maryland approves so strongly the atti- 
tude and the course of action taken by the administration. I myself cordially 
and heartily approve it, and I am sure that it meets with general approval and 
support. I do not think anyone will differ with him materially as to the char- 
acter of Zelaya, but the practical question which is presented to me is one of 
very great difficulty. How can we separate the criminal from the innocent 
country and people whom he has Involved in his crimes, and how can we besi 
exact the reparation due to us for what can only be called the murder of our 
citizens ? 

Not only in the United States, but also in Nicaragua and thrbugh- 
out Central America, Zelaya's act of barbarity was condemned. Even 
Madriz, who succeeded him, the ablest lawyer among the Liberals, 
in a letter of January 7, 1910, regarding the execution of Cannon 
and Groce, said : 

After a personal study of the circumstances in which that deed was com- 
mitted I deplore it as illegal, and I consider as just the resentment which for 
that reason is felt in the minds of the Government and of the people of the 
United States. The Nicaraguan Government will do everything necessary to 
give complete satisfaction for that resentment and will await with a spirit 
entirely friendly and rigorously observant of justice of the demands of the 
American Government, and will make reparation with the best good will ao 
soon as possible for the evil caused by that unfortunate event. 

The second criticism is that Mr. Madriz, who was the successor of 
Zelaya, became the constitutional President of Nicaragua and should 
have received recognition as such by t\j^ United States. 

To this claim the department responded that his Government was 
neither de jure nor de facto, and it refused to recognize either faction 
in Nicaragua, but announced its determination to hold each of the 
leaders responsible for the protection of American life and property 
in the territory under his immediate control. 

Unfortunately for the contention made by his partisans, Madriz, 
before he had any expectation of becoming%he heir of Zelaya, had 
proven conclusively in a vigorous legal treatise " that Zelaya is a 



14 AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICAKAGUA. 

dishonest public official who has trampled upon the laws of the Re- 
public; that he has been guilty of treason to the constitution; that 
lie is not the legitimate President, but a usurper of the public power ; 
and that his government perturbs and dishonors Central America." 
By the* same reasoning Madriz's title was also invalid, because 
lie was never elected, and his only claim to office was based on the 
action of his predecessor in " depositing the power " in him. Fur- 
thermore, he was clearly ineligible to receive the " deposit " because 
he was not a member of the national assembly, as required by the 
constitution then in force; he was not the Vice President, nor a 
cabinet minister, and, in fact, had not lived in Nicaragua for 14 
years. Zelaya just willed the office to him like personal property. 

His title was defective de facto as well as de jure. He never 
showed the slightest possibility of putting down the revolution or 
causing his authority to be obeyed. He surrounded himself with the 
same corrupt leaders and indulged the same cruel practices as 
Zelaya, with the result that he forfeited whatever good will the 
people might have felt for having been freed from tyranny; and 
the revolution which at first was confined to the Atlantic coast spread 
across the country, and after overcoming the almost insuperable 
obstacles of mountains and swamps, reached the capital. To excuse 
his failure to check it, Madriz charged that American Navy officers 
had interfered with his military operations. As a matter of fact 
they had only taken the customary step of prohibiting bombard- 
ment or fighting by either faction within the unfortified and un- 
garrisoned commercial city of Bluefields, thus protecting the pre- 
ponderating American and other foreign interests, just as the com- 
mander of the British cruiser had done a few days previously at 
Greytown where there were large British interests. In the Greytown 
case it happened that the action taken favored the Madriz forces, 
while at Bluefields the result was quite the opposite; but the real 
test of strength between the two factions took place inland, far re- 
moved from both the British and American naval vessels, and there 
Madriz was overwhelmed by force of arms and fled from the country. 
The new leaders established their authority and suppressed all or- 
ganized resistance without having at any time received de facto 
recognition from the United States. Formal diplomatic relations 
between the Washington and Managua Governments were not re- 
stored until after the people of Nicaragua had passed on the merits 
of the revolution by holding a general election. 

The third criticism is that the " conservative " government of 
Estrada-Diaz, which followed the " liberal " regime of Zelaya- 
Madriz, was corrupt and despotic, and the program of American 
financial reorganization which it adopted worked great injustice to 
Nicaragua. 

The words " conservative '• and " liberal " have no meaning and 
give a totally erroneous impression, for not all the soliditj^ and 
wisdom of the country are found in the group which bears one 
label, nor all the turbulence and corruption in the other; and, in- 
versely, not all the narrowness and fanaticism are in the first, nor 
all the progress and honesty in the second. There is a mixture of 
good and bad in both^but neither deserves to be called a political 
party. Nicaraguan politics are difficult to grasp, for the reason that 
there are no parties in the American sense of the word, and that the 



AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 15 

people, instead of being aligned in two groups known as conserva- 
tives and liberals, are divided into many small factions, the number 
and size depending on the influence and ambition of petty leaders or 
the vengefulness of disappointed office seekers. 

To understand the complete absence of political issues or principles 
it is sufficient to recall a few recent incidents. When the " conserva- 
tive " government came into power after the flight of Madriz, it was 
made up of President Estrada, the leader of the revolution, who was 
a liberal, and a cabinet composed of Moncada, also a liberal, Diaz, 
Chamorro, and Mena, conservatives. The title of president was 
merely nominal, for all real power was exercised by Mena, who was 
in control of the army, as minis1?er of war. The latter with the aid 
of certain conservatives ousted Estrada, the liberal president, by 
forcing his resignation and exile from the country; when Diaz, the 
conservative, succeeded to the presidency, a coup d'etat against his 
government was attempted by Mena, a conservative, with the sup- 
port of the liberals. In such a mess it is idle to try to discover any 
distinction between liberals and conservatives, and when the terms 
are used hereinafter they are to be understood as having only an 
approximate meaning. 

The charge Q^f corruption made against the Estrada-Diaz adminis- 
tration is based on the issue of some millions of paper money and the 
payment of large sums in the guise of claims to various members of 
the faction in power. 

It is unfortunately true that there were great issues of paper money. 
This is an evil practice which exists not only in Central America but 
also in Mexico. During Estrada's administration about 24,000,000 
pesos were forced into circulation as compared to 32,000,000 issued 
by Zelaya and Madriz. There is this difference to be noted, that 
President Diaz reformed the monetary conditions in Nicaragua by 
retiring the depreciated bills and placing the new currency on a gold 
exchange basis, which is guaranteed by the maintenance of an ample 
gold reserve fund. 

It is very likely true that large sums were paid to prominent mem- 
bers of the Government, but as they were for the most part persons 
who had been compelled to submit to " forced loans," exacted by 
Madriz and Zelaya, there is something to be said on their side of the 
case as to the justice of their claims for reimbusement, even if not for 
the method of their payment, against which the department protested. 
In further understanding of these matters it ought to be remembered 
that all during the time of the corrupt or irregular practices, Mena 
was in control of the treasury department, and it was because of the 
effort to eliminate him from the cabinet and thereby suppress the 
evil, that both Estrada and Diaz, in turn, met with misfortune, 
Estrada being obliged to resign the presidency, and Diaz forced to 
contend with an insurrection. In other words, the same element in 
Nicaragua, which is now making the loudest complaint, is the one 
which supported Mena, who was responsible for the dishonest prac- 
tices. 

In this connection it may be added that it was for the very purpose 
of preventing the payment of any exorbitant or unjust demands that 
the Estrada government favored the program of control of finances 
by the United States, and the appointment of a mixed claims com- 
mission, composed of two American judges and one Nicaraguan, to 



16 AMEKICAISr POLICY FX XICAEAGUA. 

pass on domestic as well as foreign claims under the provisions of 
the Knox-Castrillo loan convention Avhich failed of approval by the 
Senate. 

The importance of this claims commission has never been fully 
understood, because the principal functions contemplated for the 
commissioners were never put into operation on account of the ab- 
sence of treaty sanction. It was an entirely new idea in our diplo- 
macy and was intended to supply a deficiency which has long been 
recognized, namely, that there is no machinery in the Department 
of State for determining the validity or for apportioning equitably 
the extent and nature of claims which our Government is frequently 
called upon to urge against certain 'Latin-American countries, and as 
their courts are often mere tools in the hands of a dictator neither 
our own nor foreign Governments are willing to submit to such 
decisions as final. It was to meet this need for a competent and 
impartial tribunal that the claims commission was organized. It is 
not to be confused with the ordinary mixed-claims commission, be- 
cause, although its members are of two different nationalities^ — 
American and Nicaraguan— yet it is not an international but a 
national court, appointed b}^ and under the laws of Nicaragua. 

The British and German Governments declined tc^ recognize it or 
to submit their claims to its jurisdiction, and there was no way to 
bring pressure to bear on them to change their attitude, because of 
failure of Senate approval of the loan convention. The British 
Government threatened in May, 1912, that it would force payment of 
its claims unless Nicaragua was prepared to enter into a treaty con- 
ceding certain fishery rights, which were objectionable because of 
territorial privileges carried b}' them. Later on German interests 
attempted to get from the Nicaraguan Government a concession to 
canalize the San Juan Eiver and to navigate the river and lakes in 
connection with a scheme for the colonization and exploitation of 
certain banana plantations in Costa Eica. 

Another important function contemplated for the commission was 
the examination of the validity of all the contracts or concessions 
granted by preceding administrations in Nicaragua and the assess- 
ment of damages in cases of cancellation, amendment, or expropria- 
tion of such contracts. Secretary Knox was thus putting into prac- 
tice the idea afterwards so earnestly advocated by President Wilson 
in his Mobile speech, in which he declared that the system of grant- 
ing " concessions " was responsible for " a condition of affairs always 
dangerous and apt to become intolerable " ; that the States suffering 
from them are in need of "emancipation from the subordination," 
and " we ought to be the first in assisting them in that emancipa- 
tion." 

The fourth criticism is that the landing of marines at Corinto at 
the time of the Mena insurrection was an unprecedented violation of 
territory, and their retention in Managua is the only thing that 
prevents the downfall of the Diaz administration. 

It is a well-established principle of international law that any. 
Government has the right to land and use forces on foreign territory 
to protect its own nationals. This practice has been observed not 
only by the United States, but also by the British, French, and other 
European Governments. As many as two score instances may be 
mentioned of such action in Latin American countries, and that the 
precedent will continue to be followed, when circumstances require. 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 17 

is shown by the recent case of Haiti, not to mention Vera Cruz. The- 
landing at Corinto may be further distinguished in that it was at 
the express invitation of the Nicaraguan Government; and in this 
respect there is also a precedent, for in 1896 President Cleveland 
disembarked forces at the same port, on official request of the Zelaya 
Government, by note of February 25, to protect property and to 
support the Government against revolutionists. The two cases have 
a surprising resemblance, further accentuated by the circumstance 
that President Cleveland also directed, through the Secretary of 
the Navy, that the marines should proceed inland to Leon, if neces- 
sary and expedient, to rescue a messenger of the American Legation 
who was reported to have been arrested or detained by the revolu- 
tionists; and by the further circumstance that the commanding offi- 
cer served a notice on the lawless element that he was prepared to 
prevent by force, if necessary, pillaging of the English bank at Leon. 
Three years later marines were again disembarked on Zelaya's re- 
quest at Bluefields, and held possession of the port for some time 
until the arr:val of his troops. 

Perhaps a possible distinction in the two cases of landing United 
States Marines at Corinto is that in 1896 it was British property, 
principally, that was to be protected, while in 1912 American in- 
terests were preponderant. It must also be remembered that the 
present Nicaraguan Government had been jfirmly established in power 
two years before the marines arrived to protect American property 
against Mena's lawlessness ; it had long since driven out the Madriz 
usurpers, overcome all armed resistance to its authority, and con- 
firmed its right to exist by popular elections. The Diaz Government 
has thus shown that it not only controls sufficient force to maintain 
itself in power, but also that it rests on the will of a majority of the 
people. 

In the statement that if the marines should be withdrawn from 
Managua the Diaz administration would succumb there is an inti- 
mation that the presence of the American forces is against the wishes 
of the Nicaraguan people. Experience, hoAvever, has shown quite 
the contrary. Even Leon, after the Mena disturbance was sup- 
pressed and tha city returned to Government control, requested and 
urged that the marines be kept there in preference to Nicaraguan 
troops, because of fear of reprisals from their late opponents. Manj?' 
of the leading Liberal^ declared to our officers that they had more 
confidence in the Americans than in their own countrymen. At 
Chinandega, the fourth largest town, the most prominent citizens, 
irrespective of party, expressed the desire to have an American naval 
officer rule them permanently. At Granada the citizens in mass 
meeting adopted resolutions of thanks and transmitted a memorial 
to Admiral Southerland, the commanding officer, in just recognition 
of his remarkably successful handling of a difficult situation, saying : 

Because of the hishly marked benefits tliat we have received from the pro- 
tection of the Americans, we send to you and those serving under you, in the 
name of this community, an expression of our sincere gratitude, asking that 
you present these sentiments to the Government of your generous country, and 
our hope and desire that the sacrifices made by you "will give as result an 
established and enduring peace in Nicaragua. 

A pathetic letter was sent by the women describing the — 

state of horror and fright in which mothers, daughters, wives, and sisters saw 
themselves, eacli moment threatened with the loss of all they held most dear; 
S. Doc. 334, 64-1 2 



18 AMEKICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA, 

* * * we celebrated with enthusiasm your arrival on the shores of Nica- 
ragua as an omen that soon our ills would cease. Our hopes were fulfilled, 
inasmuch as you have given with wonderful rapidity the peace and tranquillity 
that we so much longed for. 

On a march which the marines made through the country and over 
the mountains they were met everywhere by reception committees 
and escorted to the cities, where they were received with enthusiasm, 
most notably at Matagalpa and Rivas. That such friendly feeling 
prevailed was due in great part to the confidence and respect aroused 
in the people by the exemplary conduct of the marines and blue- 
jackets officered by men of such tact, firmness, and common sense, as 
shown, for example, by Maj. Smedley Butler, whose battalion, being 
the earliest to arrive in Nicaragua, was responsible for first impres- 
sions. 

In a letter of appreciation to the commanding officer November 10, 
1912, the American manager of the railroad wrote from Managua : 

Speaking of the interests I have the honor to represent, their property, com- 
prising all the steamers and most of the railway, was in the hands of bandits, 
vandals, and miscreants ; our very lives were in jeopardy, and our confidence 
in the governing powers badly shaken when your opportune arrival brought 
order out of chaos, restored property to its rightful owners and freedom to 
many a despairing prisoner, for all of which the country owes to you a debt of 
gratitude which can never be paid. 

A like sentiment prevailed on the Atlantic coast. The Press, of 
Bluefields, in an article of October 13, said that it — 

desires to express in the name of the foreign colony its hearty and sincere appre- 
ciation of the orderliness, propriety, and universal good conduct observed by 
the Takoma's boys ; and, further, to assure the bluejackets and men of the 
Marine Corps that their fellow countrymen here are proud of them and consider 
them a credit to the uniforms they wear. ^ 

This favorable opinion was held not only by natives and foreigners 
alike but it was given official expression in a note to the American 
legation from the foreign office and in a special act of the National 
Assembly, indorsing what had been done." In fact, it may be said 
that the mass of the Nicaraguan people welcome any influence that 
gives promise of releasing them from barbarous persecution and of 
permitting them to live in peace. This only complaint against the 
Americans comes from the dissatisfied politicians, the Zelayistas, 
and those who live on revolutions. This truth has been testified to 
again and again by naval officers who have visited the country. Thus 
Commander Benson of the Albany reported in April, 1909, during 
a visit at Corinto in Zelaya's time : 

There is a bitter and contemptuous feeling of the governing [Zelayista] class 
toward the United States, but the general mass of the people are most heartily 
in sympathy with the United States and its policies. The country is prac- 
tically under a reign of terror; everyone seems afraid of doin'g or saying 
anything that might reach the President. 

The Associated Press correspondent, sent to Nicaragua at the 
beginning of the Madriz regime, reported in the dispatch which ' 
was published on January 27, 1910 : 

I expect trouble here when Madriz arrives. Leon alone is for him, and 
the garrisons of Managua and Granada are being made up afresh of soldiers 
from Leon. * * * There is no genuine hostility toward Americans and no 
chance of a spontaneous uprising against them ; but there is every likelihood 
of an organized uprising of armed resistance commanded to docile soldiers by 
politicians bent upon diverting public indignation from themselves and resort- 
ing to the simple trick of summoning the specter of foreign invasion and 
annexation by people of another race. 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 19 

Admiral Kimball, who commanded the squadron in Nicaraguan 
waters at the time of Zelaya's flight, reported that he could control 
the situation without any show of force. The reason that this 
would be possible, he added, was because while there is a theory that 
the Nicaraguans hate and detest Americans and everything Ameri- 
can, " they actually have a childish and unquestioning faith in the 
kindness, helpfulness, innate fairness, and boundless power of the 
people of the United States and the Government that represents 
them." 

If then the Diaz government is strong enough to sustain itself, 
and there is no unfriendly feeling on the part of the Nicaraguan 
people against the United States, the question may quite naturally 
be asked why the marines are retained as a legation guard. 

There are several reasons for not withdrawing them at this time. 
In the first place it would be construed as an invitation to resume 
disorders. The mass of the people, while ordinarily peaceably in- 
clined, are uneducated and easily misled. If our forces were re- 
moved, the impression would be created that the United States had 
lost confidence in President Diaz and desired his elimination from 
office. A similar belief as to Zelaya, it will be remembered, caused 
his flight from the country, with hardly a struggle, by the mere 
severance of diplomatic relations. 

There is another reason. Insurrections in Nicaragua, as elsewhere 
in Central America, are nothing but military uprisings and not popu- 
lar movements in any sense.^ The only exception to this rule that 
can be recalled was the Bluefields revolution which drove out the 
Zelaya-Madriz regime, and which, though it started with an insig- 
nificant defection of troops on the Atlantic coast, met with such 
popular support that it crossed the mountains, spread throughout 
the country, and engulfed all three cities of Managua, Leon, and 
Granada. But this was an unusual case. The trouble ordinarily 
starts with the mutiny of a garrison or the seizure of the arsenal, 
sometimes accompanied by the capture of the President. To guard 
against these perils, two alternative practices have generally been 
adopted: Either collect all the war munitions and a majority of 
forces in one central garrison, or else distribute them in the three 
leading cities of Managua, Leon, and Granada. The first method 
possesses the merit of limiting the danger of disloyalty to one local- 
ity, but it has the corresponding disadvantage of leaving the Gov- 
ernment without means of defense in case of its loss; the second 
gives the ruler two bases of defense in the event of mishap to 
the third, but increases the hazard of treachery threefold. Now, by 
retaining the marines at the capital, all military supplies can be 
concentrated at that one point under their control without the neces- 
sity of having any army at all except for police purposes, as in 
Panama. Therefore the presence of only a few marines serves a 
purpose in guarding against disorders which would otherwise re- 
quire the maintenance by Nicaragua of several thousand troops, and 
the restoration of the objectionable system of militarism; at the same 
time their presence exercises a strong moral influence in preventing 
abuses and reprisals by subordinate Government authorities. Under 
present conditions the Government can devote itself to working out 
its numerous economic problems and to encouraging peaceful pur- 



20 AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 

suits without the constant anxiety of preparing against the attacks 
of malcontent politicians or against treachery by ambitious generals^ 
like Mena, unable to resist the temptation of using for selfish pur- 
poses the power confided to them. 

Possibly the most important reason of all is that if disorders break 
out again in Nicaragua they will undoubtedly spread to Honduras 
and Guatemala. It is better to keep a few marines where they are^ 
especially during the continuance of uncertainty in Mexico, rather 
than to run the risk of having a condition of turbulence in all the 
region from the Rio Grande to the Canal Zone. 

If it be asked how long the marines are to be continued in Man- 
agua, the answer is, until some equally good arrangement is made 
that will assure the maintenance of peace. One such arrangement, 
of course, is the negotiation of a treaty that will leave no doubt that 
the United States discountenances military conspiracies and favors 
constitutional order. There has been no war or revolution in Panama 
since the signing of the canal treaty with that Republic, and Panama 
has been able to disband its army and save the expense of a military 
establishment. Furthermore, there has been no necessity for using 
the American forces on the Isthmus. The belief that they would be 
used to preserve order if occasion required has been sufficient. 

1 he filth criticism is that the Liberals are in an overwhelming 
majority and would win the presidency if guaranteed free, honest 
elections, under the supervision of the United States. 

Whether their claim of supremacy and their proposal for testing 
it are sincere or not may be judged by the attitude assumed by them 
when in control of the Government during the Zelaya-Madriz regime. 

After Madriz had been engaged for three months in a futile and 
bloody attempt to suppress the Bluefields revolution, during which 
more lives were lost than in any equal period of a similar disturbance, 
Estrada, the leader of the revolution, having demonstrated by force 
of arms the power of his following, made an oifer on March 3, 1910, 
in which he proposed that the United States should be invited to 
mediate, and to supervise elections for the choosing of a President 
and Vice President of the Republic. Madriz responded that he was 
the legitimate successor of Zelaya,.and that patriotism prevented him 
from admitting a foreign nation to act as intermediary in internal 
confiicts. Four months later, when the victorious revolutionists had 
arrived at the gates of the capital,^ he changed his mind, and appealed 
to the department to interpose on behalf of peace, expressing his 
willingness " to follow every indication which the Government of 
the United States may be pleased to make," and when it was too late 
he requested mediation by the foreign consular corps in order that he 
might make a dignified and safe exit from the country. 

During the 18 years of liberal government under Gen. Jose Santos 
Zelaya and Dr. Madriz, not even the form of an election was gone 
through with, unless an exception may be made of the occasion when 
three candidates, Jose, Santos, and Zelaya, were put up and were 
A^oted for — a cynical bit of humor on the part of the dictator. 

If the " liberals " were in the majority it is surprising that they 
never demonstrated the fact by holding an election while they were 
m control of the machinery. To anyone who understands the situa- 
tion in Nicaragua, the reason of their refusal is very simple. No 



AMEKICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 21 

party has a majority; there is no political cohesiveness whatsoever. 
When one faction is in office, the other factions form a sort of tempo- 
rary combination to overturn the administration, and in the confusion 
which follows each leader seizes what he can. When Zelaya was in 
power, a faction of so-called liberals attempted to throw him out by 
the revolution of 1896; then when Madriz succeeded him, other lib- 
orals constantly intrigued for their own advancement and against the 
administration, as shown by the records of our legation in Managua. 
Again when Mena attempted his revolution against the present 
Xicaraguan Government, he was pledged the support of the liberals, 
but as soon as there was a bare prospect of success three or four 
•' presidents " were proclaimed in different parts of the Republic. 

Admiral Kimball made a* very interesting report December 31, 1909, 
•of the visit he paid Madriz at the executive mansion, in Managua. 
Madriz explained why he had accepted the presidency from Zelaya, 
whom he had denounced as a usurper, and from a Congress which he 
had proved to be illegal, on the ground that he thought this was the 
best way to avoid bloodshed ; he was disappointed in that he had ex- 
pected the best men of Nicaragua to come to his aid, but so far only 
a few personal friends and a horde of self-interested people had ap- 
proached him; discussing elections, he called attention to the fact 
that— 

tliere is at present absolutely no registration upon which to hold an, election, 
that practically a generation has passed away and a new one had come i;p since 
elections were abolished by Zelaya ; that he would endeavor to establish a satis- 
factory registration of voters, and an election that would be respected ; that 
of. course laborers on the coffee fincas and plantations would vote much as their 
patrons desired, but this was also the case during the 30 years of peace. 

The admiral, who had formed a friendly attachment for Madriz, 
continues : 

I asked him who, in his opinion, would l)e elected if such an election as he had 
outlined could be held. He said that Juan Estrada or Espinoza would probably 
be successful since their revolt against Zelaya would give them prestige; possibly 
a man of his (Madriz) faction of the liberal party might succeed, and that 
there was nothing impossible in supposing that a nominee of the conservatives 
might develop sufticient sti'ength. 

That Madriz's estimate of the possible strength of Estrada was cor- 
rect, was shown by the elections held in 1910 after the restoration of 
order, when the ticket composed of Juan Estrada, a liberal, for presir 
dent, and Adolfo Diaz, a conservative, for vice president, both leaders 
of the the Bluefields movement, received a major'ty of the votes. 
Two years later, in November, 1912, at a direct popular election Diaz 
for president and Solorzano for vice president, were the successful 
nominees. Thus the candidacy of Diaz was passed upon twice with- 
in a very short period. His tenure in that respect will compare very 
favorably with that of the other presidents of Central America ; and 
it is hard therefore to understand why there should be any necessity 
for an American supervision of the election in Nicaragua and not in 
the other Eepublics. 

The Department of State, however, did consider the question of 
such a supervision in 1912 and inquired the views of its legation on 
the subject. In his reply the American minister said : 

I think that the general public in Nicaragua understand that the policy of 
the United States is not hostile to the liberal party as such nor to the Von; 
servative party, but is directed against the corruptionists, the intriguers, and 



22 AMERICAN POLICY I]Sr N^ICAEAGUA. 

criminals of all parties, be tliey conservatives like Mena or liberals like Ze- 
laya * * *. The ban should include also professional revolutionists. It 
is safe to say that there is not a single general on either government or rebel 
side who has not designs on the presidency. * * * it seems inadvisable to 
raise the question of elections until the army * * * has been disbanded. It 
would be unwise for the United States to supervise elections; the Panama 
precedent is hardly applicable (because the right of the United States to inter- 
fere in that country is recognized by treaty and by the constitution of the Re- 
public, notwithstanding which, the defeated party charged fraud). There has 
never been a registration of voters in Nicaragua. If we undertook the work 
we should have to do it thoroughly, and this would require more time and men 
than we have availnble. Neither party would willingly acquiesce in an adverse 
result, however fair, and we should have to bear the burden of criticism with- 
out the power to justify our course by assuring the honesty of the administra- 
tion after it enters office. The fact is the cry of fair elections just now is not 
sincere. The majority of the people are satisfied with President Diaz, and 
the malcontents are more desirous of securing the presidency than of having 
honest elections. The Mena rebellion, which was supported by the Zelayistas, 
affords conclusive proof of this assertion. Mena never questioned the validity 
of Difiz's title to office, and he never even pretended that he himself was the 
popular choice. On the contrai-y, he denied the right and the capacity of the 
people to hold an election. Diaz stood for the principle of direct popular elec- 
tions; Mena opposed that principle and yet the liberals supported Mena. Of 
course, the purpose was to create strife among the members of the adminis- 
tration, and in the confusion seize the power, thus eliminating both Diaz and 
Mena. There is a small coterie in the two parties which feels each against the 
other the bitter hostility inherited from Spanish colonial days to such an ex- 
treme that they would both prefer to have the United States govern the country 
rather than see the opposing faction in office. This feeling is one source of 
Diaz's sl^rength. Almost every military leader who is unalble to conquer the 
country for himself prefers Diaz or some equally peaceful civilian to any rival 
general. Many prominent government officials and a great number of influ- 
ential liberals have privately expressed the opinion that the only hope for peace 
in Nicaragua is to be found in government of the country by the United States. 
My own opinion is that this is not at all necessnry and that on the contrary 
we should not interfere in local affairs at all except in so far as may be neces- 
sary to insure order and protection to life and property. The matters cov- 
ered by this exception could most probably hereafter be controlled as in 
Panama by moral influence. 

The last election held in Nicaragua produced some interesting results. 
Diaz was nominated for the presidency by the conservatives, and Gen. 
Chamorro, generously waiving his own candidacy in a commendable 
spirit of harmony, pledged himself to support that nomination, and 
honorably lived up to his pledge, but many of Chamorro's followers 
])roved recalcitrant and insisted on voting for him, with the result 
that although not elected, nevertheless he carried the city of Granada. 
This fact has its interest because it tends to show that if the people of 
any district really favor a candidate they can carry the election for 
him, notwithstanding the administration's control of the machinery, 
recosTiition of which circumstance probably influenced Zelaya and 
Madriz in refusing to call elections when thev were in powder. The 
liberals did not put up any candidate against Diaz, either because they 
could not agree upon one or else they preferred to let the contest go by 
default and then attempt to oust him by raising the cry for new and 
fair elections. But many of them fearing that Chamorro might defeat 
Diaz voted for the latter. A final canvass of the ballots showed that for 
president Diaz received 23.467, Chamorro, 2,229 ; and Baca, 34 ; for vice 
president Solorzano, 25.667; Espinoza, 32; and scattering votes for 
Gen. Saenz and Manuel Lacayo. If these figures may be taken as true, 
and there is no reason to belieA^e the contrary, they seem to indicate 
that the vote of the whole country in a contested campaign would be 
almost equally divided between the so-called conservatives and 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 23 

liberals. It will be noted that the combined vote of Diaz and 
Chamorro is 26,000, not counting conservatives who did not go to the 
polls. There has never been an accurate census of the Republic, but 
the population is generally estimated at 500,000, and allowing one- 
eighth as the proportion of male voters would give slightly over 
60,000, indicating how evenly divided are the two parties. It is 
doubtful, however, if any Liberal leader could poll the full strength 
of his party because of the many factional fights in Leon and else- 
where, and the absence of any real party principles or political issues. 
For similar reasons it is equally difficult to determine in advance the 
vote-getting ability of any Conservative candidate. 

The sixth criticism^s that the Liberals are at least entitled to share 
in a coalition government and obtain half the patronage. 

This proposal sounds suspiciously like the one they made in 1893, 
when President Sacasa was in power, and which resulted in an agree- 
ment signed on May 31 of that year at Sabana Grande, whereby it 
was provided that Machado should become President and select his 
cabinet from among the members of the two parties. The written 
document contained this binding clause, signed by the American 
diplomatic representative : 

The minister of the United States interposes in the as^i-eement his official 
mediation and his moral guaranty for the good faith and the compliance hy 
both sides. 

Within six weeks therefrom, or, to be exact, on July 11, the Liberals 
at Leon seized President Machado, who had been invited to pay a 
visit there, and during the confusion which resulted from his im- 
prisonment, Zelaya with a small force marched on Managua, and 
after barbarously bombarding the unfortified capital, against the 
vigorous protest of the American minister, who had signed the 
Sabana Grande agreement, proclaimed himself President — and was 
duly recognized. Zelaya began his regime by defying the United 
States and ended by murdering two of its citizens. 

The coalition government of Machado did not last two months. 
Hardly any better success has been obtained by the more recent 
efforts at this sort of compromise. As soon as a member of an op- 
posing faction is given an important office in the administration he 
at once begins to use it to overthrow the Government in the iilterest 
of himself and his faction. Mena is the most recent example of the 
futility of this sort of compromise. In the present uncertainty in 
Central America it would be especially dangerous to give a cabinet 
appointment in Nicaragua to any of the Zelaya faction because he 
would use his office to aid or incite revolution in Honduras and 
Guatemala. A division of power in Nicaragua, as elsewhere, means 
lack of efficiency, absence of responsibility, and utter confusion. 

The seventh criticism is that the pending canal treaty is objection- 
able not only because it is unpopular in Nicaragua, but also that it 
violates the rights of the other Central American States. 

When the treaty was being negotiated it came up for general 
discussion in Nicaragua, and was debated both in the National As- 
sembly and by private individuals. Many of the leading citizens 
favored the inclusion of stipulations in the nature of a Piatt amend- 
ment, but it was thought by the legation that such an amendment 
might lessen the chances^ of approval by the United States Senate, 
so it was dropped. A " junta de notables," or conference of promi- 
nent men, was called and urged the prompt passage of the measure. 



24 AMEKICAK POLICY IN XICAEAGUA. 

The assembly considered the treaty at length, made a slight change 
which was accepted by the department, and then voted approval 
by more than the necessary majority. Nor was their action without 
precedent, for Nicaragua has entered into innumerable contracts 
and treaties, such as those signed by Ministers Squier and Hise, 
and Secretaries Cass, Dickinson, and Frelinghuysen, relating to 
the construction of a proposed canal and to the navigation of the 
San Juan Eiver as a part thereof. Zelaya and the present complain- 
ing liberals negotiated several such agreements, principally with 
Europeans, among which may be mentioned a contract of June 5, 
1897, with tjie Atlas Steamship Co., a British corporation, for the 
exclusive navigation of the San Juan Eiver and Lake Nicaragua; 
and another of October 27, 1898, conceding a canal option to the 
Grace-Cragin Syndicate, in consideration of the payment of $100,000 
cash and $400,000 on time. Kemonstrance against this speculative 
concession was made without avail by the Department of State, but 
fortunately the contract lapsed on account of failure to meet the later 
installments. 

The canal treaty signed at Mangua is reasonably generous to the 
interests of Nicaragua. It provides for the payment of $3,000,000 in 
trust, to be used for purposes of general education, public works, and 
for the welfare of the country. It was at the suggestion of President 
Diaz himself that the clause was inserted that no disbursements should 
be made except with the consent of the secretary of state, thus doing 
away with any opportunity for a dishonest or improvident use of 
the funds. 

If this convention has caused any dissatisfaction in the other 
States of Central America, it must be due to a misunderstanding of 
its terms. The text of the treaty, that is to say, in its original form, 
has never been made public, and it is therefore difficult to understand 
on what grounds objection has been raised. As a matter of fact the 
treaty, so far as the canal feature is concerned, concedes merely an 
option and not the title to a canal strip as in Panama, the idea being 
that when the actual construction becomes necessary a new contract 
will be negotiated, but that in the meanwhile, if the treaty is ratified, 
the wjiole canal agitation will cease because of the exclusive option 
given to the United States. When a new contract for actual con- 
struction is to be negotiated it will then be time enough to consider 
any rights or interests of the neighboring States ; and it will then, but 
not before, become necessary for Nicaragua, according to the terms 
of a convention now in force, to consult with Costa Rica, that country 
being interested because its territory is partly bounded by the San 
Juan River, which would most likely become a link in the canal 
system when built. 

Speaking historically, it is a grave error to assume that the other 
States in Central America are opposed to the construction of a 
canal across Nicaragua by the United States. They have frequently 
expressed their approval of such a policy, most notably at the time 
the United States was engaged in the negotiations which eventually 
resulted in the Frelinghuysen-Zavala treaty. In the early part of 
1883 Mr. Hall, the American minister to Central America, then re- 
siding in Guatemala, was instructed to sound out the five Govern- 
ments to which he was accredited. On May 4 he reported the result 
of a visit to Salvador, where the President, the minister of foreign 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 25 

affairs, and other prominent men expressed the hope that the canal 
would be constructed across the territory of Nicaragua and owned 
and operated by the United States. In an official note the foreign 
office confirmed this understanding, calling especial attention to the 
importance of the project to Salvador, because of it being the only 
■country in Central America without a port on the Atlantic coast, 
and therefore deprived of the advantages of direct communication 
with the eastern section of the United States. Not contenting itself 
with these cordial and earnest expressions (for which no compensa- 
tion was asked in those days), Salvador displayed great activity 
with the other Republics in bringing influence to bear on Nicaragua 
for the signing of such a treaty with the United States, and Presi- 
dent Zaldivar visited Managua to use his personal influence in that 
behalf. The Honduran and Guatemalan foreign ministers, acting 
for their respective Governments, likeAvise sent official notes indors- 
ing the project most enthusiastically. The Costa Rican Government 
went even further and addressed a note to Secretary Frelinghuysen 
appealing to the United States in favor of the Nicaraguan canal on 
the ground of American fraternity and joint interests. 

If any of the present political leaders in these republics are opposing 
the pending treaty because of the cession of territory for naval pur- 
poses in Fonseca Bay, they are certainly flying in the face of precedent 
in their own countries. Each and all of the States of Central America 
have at one time or another offered to make similar grants of land 
to jthe United States. In May, 1881, Guatemala proposed to cede 
Ocos Bay for a coaling station; in December, 1901, Costa Rica en- 
tered into similar negotiations for a lease of 200 years of Port Elena, 
and in April, 1906, offered to sell Cocos Island for a naval or wireless 
station; on September 28, 1849, a treaty was signed with Honduras 
by Mr. Squier, the American minister, granting to the United States 
valuable stretches of land for naval stations on Tigre Island, also 
known as Amapala. in the Gulf of Fonseca, and for fortifications 
along the shore of the bay; again, in September, 1885, the Govern- 
ment of Honduras made a formal proposal to grant to the United 
States the right to establish and maintain coaling and naval stations 
on both the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts, namely, in the Bay 
Islands and the Gulf of Fonseca, the purpose being " that the pres- 
ence on its coast of vessels of the United States would favor the in- 
terests of both countries and would create new ties of friendship." 

Salvador has no coast on the Atlantic side, and though having a 
frontage on the Gulf of Fonseca, possesses little territory of strategic 
value. The people, however, have always been extremely friendly 
to the United States, and at the time, when they were more united 
in political sentiment than ever before or since, they appealed to the 
United States for annexation, and sent two commissioners to Wash- 
ington to urge their petition. 

The eighth criticism is that the^ pending canal treaty is further 
objectionable because it will prevent a union of Central America. 

When the colonies proclaimed their independence of Spain and 
severed the bonds that united them to the mother country, there 
arose a strong popular sentiment that they should emulate the ex- 
ample of the United States and organize themselves into a single, 
vigorous Republic, that would be able to withstand foreign aggres- 
sion and to^win for itself a position in the family of nations. Ac- 



26 AMERICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 

cordingly in 1823 a federation was established with its capital at 
Guatemala City, but almost immediately dissensions broke out, sev- 
eral of the States seceded, the union came to an end, and its president, 
Morazan, was executed in 1842. Since that time there have been 
numerous attempts at restoration, which not only proved futile, but 
also have served to increase the jealousies and enmities among the 
several States. 

The attitude toward the question of confederation Avhich the 
United States adopted at the outset and has continued ever since, was 
expressed by Secretary Seward in 1863, as follows: 

The President regards the agitation of the question of a reunion of tlie Cen- 
tral American Republics with favor, not, however, because he is prepared to 
say that the measure is practicable or expedient, but simply because it indi- 
cates a conviction that there are some common evils existing in the several 
States of Central America which are constantly repi'oducing civil and inter- 
national wars, and a will and a purpose on the part of American statesmen 
there to correct them, but — 

He adds — 

there is no desire on the part of the President to seem to favor coercion in the 
matter, and on the contrary, the United States will remain equally the friend 
of the Central American powers whether they reunite or prefer to remain dis- 
tinct and independent. 

After repeated unsuccessful attempts to restore the union an im- 
pression began to be held in the United States that certain of the 
Republics were not so much interested in the federation as they were in 
establishing their own ascendancy at the expense of their neighbors, 
and that in particular Nicaragua, which controlled the canal route, 
appeared to be menaced by acts of aggression. Early in 1880 Secre- 
tary Evarts instructed the American minister at Guatemala that the 
United States would not look with favor on any " schemes of aggran- 
dizement " by which " the individuality of any of the States of 
Central America would disappear in turmoil or conquest," but he 
reiterated the settled policy of the United States that it would 
regard with approbation " such an intimacy of union between the 
States of Central America as would not only secure their domestic 
interests but render them outwardly strong against the rest of the 
world." 

Very similar views were expressed by Secretary Bayard in an 
instruction of March 10, 1885, that while the United States " deems 
advisable a voluntary combination of interests of the Central Ameri- 
can States, no display of force on the part of any one or more States 
to coerce the others can be countenanced." And when it began to be 
made clear that the plan of restoring the union was a mere pretext 
on the part of ambitious tyrants to maintain themselves in office and 
extend their power to control the valuable possessions of neighboring 
States, the attitude of the United States, while none the less friendly 
to the idea of confederation, nevertheless became more insistent in 
discountenancing the use of force to bring it about. Thus, on Feb- 
ruary 27, 1888, Secretary Bayard instructed our minister in Guate- 
mala as follows : 

I learn that much disquietude is felt in Nicaraguti by reason of rumors that 
the plan of consolidation or amalgamation of the Central American Republics, 
which received so serious a check when undertaken by Gen. Barrios a few 
years ago, is proposed to be revived by his successor, Gen. Barillas. * * * 

The great interest expressed in the proposed construction of the interoceanic 
canal by citizens of the United States, under charter granted according to the 



AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICAKAGUA, 27 

laws of the United States, and the concern naturally felt for the security of the 
vast capital necessary for the accomplishment of such a work under effective 
guaranties of stability and order, should serve to advise the statesmen of 
Guatemala of the new and important enterprises thus inaugurated, and lead 
them to realize the magnitude of the concern which would necessarily be felt 
should any ill-counseled plans of domination or control cast a doubt upon the 
capacity of the independent Central American States to maintain orderly and 
local self-government, and to observe relations of good will toward each 
other. * * * ^ 

You will carefully inquire whether any ground exists for the apprehensions 
to which I have adverted, and will likewise take an early and discreet occasion 
to convey to the Government of President Barillas the views of the Government 
of the United States which are consistently and strongly in disapproval of a 
coercive union of the Central American Republics and favorable to their inde- 
pendent, tranquil, and harmonious continuance under the reign of constitutional 
law. 

The question might well be asked why it is that so little progress 
toward a permanent union has been made, notwithstanding the evi- 
dent advantages of a single strong Republic, the popular sentiment 
favoring the idea, and the moral support which the United States 
has always been willing to lend to its peaceful achievement. Experi- 
ence gives a reply by referring to the sanguinary struggles that mark 
the abortive federation from 1823 until the execution of Morazan 
in 1842. Those 20 years witnessed such immense loss of life, destruc- 
tion of property, paralysis of commerce and agriculture that the mass 
of the people, who in the beginning had believed that confederation 
would solve the problem of peace, never desired to repeat the experi- 
ment, and took no genuine interest in any of the subsequent attempts, 
regarding them as mere schemes of aggrandizement by military rulers. 
As a matter of fact, the only reason or justification for a union of Cen- 
tral America is that under its government the people will have a 
greater assurance of stability of institutions, maintenance of order, 
and peaceful development of the resources of the country, without dan- 
ger of foreign interference. For a State to lead successfully in the , 
movement of federation it must first establish peace and order within / 
its own confines, and not depend as heretofore on the power of mili- 
tarism. If the pending canal treaty is put into effect and Nicaragua 
by reason thereof is guaranteed against future turbulence, the lesson 
will not be without its effect on the neighboring States. Such of 
them as maintain stable governments and peaceful conditions will 
soon find it to their common interests to unite, and the advantages 
of peace will strengthen Nicaragua and perhaps extend its influence, 
or even its limits, just as disorders weakened the Republic and caused 
it to lose territory to its neighbor in 1825, when the inhabitants of the 
district of Nicoya petitioned for annexation to Costa Rica in order 
to escape from the anarchy then prevailing in their own State. 

Because of the strategic position of the Central American Re- 
publics, commanding the northern approaches of the Panama Canal 
on both the Atlantic and the Pacific, some observers have expressed 
the opinion that our interest is too great not to impose on our policy 
the desirability of continuing the present system of small independ- 
ent States, and of preventing their union in what under a powerful 
dictator might become a strong nation, possibly antagonistic to our 
policies and able to invoke the intervention of foreign powers. 
Whatever might otherwise be the force of this argument, no such 
danger Avould be likely if the United States were in control of the 
canal route across Nicaragua, together with the naval base in Fonseca 



28 AMERICAJSr POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 

Bay, and on the contrary our interests and those of Central America 
would both be best served by encouraging a union of the five Re- 
publics, a result that should be decided by popular vote instead of 
military force, and that might be brought about by voluntary coales- 
cence with Nicaragua, which, with peace guaranteed, woulcl become 
the strongest and most important, because of its geographically 
strategic position. ^ 

The ninth criticism is that the whole present policy of the United 
States is an offense to the people of Nicaragua, and is condemned by 
the public sentiment of all Latin America. 

There is abundant evidence to disprove this statement, even though 
some of the competent witnesses may not wish to testify in public. 
Perhaps this may be made clearer by a few extracts from an interest- 
ing report to be found in the legation files, giving the substance 
of a conversation, in December, 1911, with a prominent Costa Rican, 
which was characterized with more than usual frankness. At 
that time Gen. Mena was using his position as a cabinet officer to 
overthrow President Diaz, and this conspiracy caused considerable 
unrest in Nicaragua, which threatened to spread to the neighboring 
republics. Discussing the American policy, the speaker declared 
that " from the point of view of Costa Rica, it would be of distinct 
advantage for the United States to be responsible for the preserva- 
tion of order in Nicaragua and Honduras. At present conditions in 
those countries were ' chaos,' and likely to continue irrespective of 
the party in power. Costa Rica was obliged to protect herself 
against this, and at the same time watch those plotting revolution 
(against Nicaragua) within her (Costa Rica's) confines. The pres- 
ent movement of Senor X against the Mena-Diaz government was 
due to his openly proclaimed belief that the United States would not 
interfere." In reply the minister said : 

I stated our reluctance to interfere, to which he retorted " that we could not 
have our cake and eat it. Either we should keep away entirely from Central 
America or else make ourselves effectively responsible for the preservation of 
order. Having overthrown the Zelaya regime it would be illogical to allow one 
of his adherents to recover it." The speaker, who is one of the best informed 
and most influential public men of Central America laid great stress on our 
pending treaties with Honduras and Nicaragua, which he regarded as the 
salvation of the situation. He thought it necessary for us to do J;here as in 
Santo Domingo, though stating that if these views were known as coming from 
him they would be regarded as treason. I remarked that our great desire had 
always been to avoid direct interference, and we had once hoped that the 
Central American Court of .Justice might prove a powerful factor in promoting 
peace. * * * As he aptly stated, what force would it invoke other than 
that of the United States, and, if so, our direct intervention would be far 
preferable. His entire argument which he expounded logically and with force 
was in favor of this, which is all the more remarkable as the violence of his 
attacks against the United States while he was in * * *, is still remembered. 

The great mass of the people of Nicaragua are friendly to the 
policy of the United States. Public meetings have been held to in- 
dorse the various measures, and the national assembly has passed 
the required legislation by reasonably ample majority. This official 
action fairly represents popular sentiment. 

Statements occasionally appear in print which seem to indicate the 
contrary and purport to express a widespread opinion of unfriendli- 
ness, but on careful examination they may be traced to European 
sources antagonistic to the spread of United States influence or to 



AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICARAGUA. 29 

persons not authorized to voice Latin- American sentiment. We are 
so earnestly desirous of the good will and friendship of the peoples 
of the southern Republics that in matters which concern them we 
become supersensitive to unfavorable comment without inquiring 
from whom it proceeds and are apt to ascribe an exaggerated im- 
portance to random and irresponsible " protests." Every bandit 
leader along the Mexican border would have us believe that any 
interference with his lawlessness is resented by the public sentiment 
of Central and South America. During the recent disorders in 
Nicaragua, when Mena and some of his alleged generals were com- 
pelled by United States marines to desist frcm plundering and de- 
stroying American property, he threatened to bring down en our 
heads the vengeance of " all Latin America." 

A characteristic example of the same kind of arrogance and ef- 
frontery appears in a recent pamphlet dealing with Nicaraguan 
affairs, as follows: 

The IMonroe doctrine, as we have reUited before, was willingly accepted by 
the peoples of all Latin America ; but when later on an amplification \^'as 
invented to signify the right of tutelage of the United States of North America 
over the other Republics of the continent this interpretation, odious, arbitrary, 
and pernicious to all Latin America, met with vigorous protest in all Latin 
America, where public opinion was unanimous in expressing itself, etc. 

Fortunately for our peace of mind, this pronouncement did net 
emanate from the ABC powers, but investigation showed that the 
self-constituted spokesman of " all Latin America " was a Russian. 
Centers of propaganda for the dissemination of this sort of stulf 
are established in Central America and at New Orleans. They origi- 
nated the Root forgery which caused so much annoyance to the 
then Senator from New York. A document pretended to quote him 
as favoring a policy of territorial aggressien and a military over- 
lordship of the entire continent by the United States. It was so 
manifestly a forgery that a denial of it by Senator Roct Avas hardly 
necessary, although he did deny it in January, 1913, so that those 
circulating the libel might have no pretense that its authenticity 
was questionable. Of course they continued to circulate it after its 
falsity was established. In New Orleans the junta is composed of 
a Honduran revolutionist, a German, and a Russian, all of them 
beneficiaries of Zelaya. 

In Central America the self-appointed defenders of Nicaraguan 
sovereignty are mostly fugitive Cubans, Colombians, and Venezue- 
lans. One of them, Masso Parra, a Cuban, was brought to Nicaragua 
by interested parties, and started a disturbance on March 6, 1913, 
near Managua, to ascertain if the new administration at Washington 
had changed the Taft policy in regard to discountenancing revolution. 
After the marines had suppressed him the legation became interested 
in his case and looked up his record, with the following results: 
Masso Parra was director of police under Zelaya, who sent him to the 
United States to be cured of a wound which had left him lame. 
There he Avas convicted and sent to Sing Sing for counterfeiting, 
whence he escaped and returned to Central America. At Managua 
he was arrested for obtaining money under false pretenses while 
ostensibly raffling a mule. During the Mena revolution he was com- 
missioned as an officer under Baca. By birth he is a Spaniard and 
began his military career in Cuba, being enrolled in the Spanish 



30 AMEKICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGTJA. 

forces that from 1896 to 1898 attempted to put down the Cuban 
revolution. Spain having lost, he remained for a time in Cuba, then 
went to the United States, where he had a precarious existence. In 
1906 he was engaged in a piratical expedition organized in New York 
against Costa Rica. He entered into an agreement with Capt. Boyn- 
ton, a notorious adventurer who had figured in many Cuban and 
Venezuelan filibuster enterprises, to arm and equip a merchant vessel 
in a harbor of the United States and then to seize Port Limon, in 
Costa Eica, which had only a small garrison, to rob the custom- 
house, then surprise the capital and after cracking the banks make 
their escape, realizing of course it would be impossible to maintain 
themselves for any length of time. The plan became known and 
was easily frustrated. 

Masso Parra then returned to Cuba and during the second Ameri- 
can occupation formed a plot to assassinate Gov. Magoon and other 
prominent persons. It was said the object was to restore Spanish 
rule, but, of course, Spain disavowed the attempt. Those implicated 
were arrested and tried, Masso being sentenced to five years in the 
penitentiary. But he remained there only two years, his sentence 
being commuted on the departure of Mr. Magoon. He was after- 
wards taken to Nicaragua and started on a career of looting in 
undefended villages, and when at last driven out, resumed connec- 
tion with the propaganda to defend the sovereignty of Nicaragua 
against the United States. 

Whatever criticism may be made of the Knox policy in Nicaragua, 
it stands the one true test of diplomacj^ — success; and the Depart- 
ment of State must be given credit for affirmative, energetic, con- 
structive action, free from all traces of opportunism. The United 
States took a stand squarely and without compromise on the side 
of peace and constitutional order in Central America and for the 
protection of American citizens abroad. A declaration of policy 
was made from time to time in formal dignified terms; then words 
were followed by deeds. In view of our attitude toward Zelaya, 
and the whole of our relations to Nicaragua and Central America, 
we could hardly have done otherwise than earnestly discountenance 
the conspirators who had adopted such methods as had Mena and his 
followers. The origin and conduct of their plot gave to the partici- 
pants the character of bandits raiding American property, rather 
than revolutionists fighting for a principle, and created on a small 
scale a situation in Nicaragua not without analogy to the outbreak 
of the Boxers in China. In these circumstances it became the duty 
of the United States not to leave American life and property at the 
mercy of such lawless elements. It was none the less our duty to 
restrain the offenders with force of arms, if necessarj^, instead of 
collecting indemnities after the damage was done, and thereby in- 
flicting punishment on the innocent and helpless mass of the people. 
This was all the more imperative as the conspirators had proclaimed, 
with amazing insolence, that the United States would be compelled 
to accept " hechos consumados," or, in plain language, that our 
Government would meekly submit to accomplished facts, irrespective 
of considerations of honor and justice. 

Hence, on the invitation of the Nicaraguan Government to land 
marines to protect our citizens, the first moderate measures were taken 
which it was hoped would speedily have the effect of putting an end 



AMEBIC AN POLICY IN jSTICARAGUA. 31 

to disturbance, and would have the indirect result of enabling the 
lawful Government, thus freed to a great extent, not from the 
responsibility but from the work of actual protection of Americans, 
to bring most of its forces directly to bear upon the suppression of 
the uprising. In order that foreign life and property might enjoy 
complete safety at the earliest possible time, that our forces would be 
able to retire after the least delay, and the moral effect upon the whole 
revolution-ridden region of Central America and the Caribbean should 
be the greatest, it was especially desirable to stimulate the efforts of 
the constitutional government of Nicaragua to restore its authority 
throughout the country. It was further believed that if the United 
States did its duty promptly, thoroughly, and impressively in Nica- 
ragua it would strengthen our hand and lighten our task not only in 
Nicaragua itself but throughout Central America and the Caribbean. 
We were having so much trouble in some of those countries, and we 
had been obliged for so long frequently to express " grave concern," 
to lodge protests, and to threaten with personal and " strict account- 
ability " the numerous bandit leaders, that the authority of our words 
seemed weakened. The lesson needed to be taught to Central America 
that the good faith of the United States was not to be treated lightly, 
and that the solemn pledges given to its representatives must be 
respected. To have sat idly by after Mena had affronted the Ameri- 
can Government by breaking faith with its minister, and to have seen 
his treachery triumph would have been a blow to our prestige in all 
the neighboring Republics. Moreover, the downfall of the lawful 
government and the inauguration of another Zelaya regime by Mena 
would not only have given rise to further contentions in Nicaragua, 
but it w^ould also have caused the spread of disorder throughout Cen- 
tral America, and a condition of chaos such as has prevailed in Mexico 
since Huerta by similar treachery seized the power in that country. 

It is customary to say of certain of the turbulent Latin- American 
Republics that what they need is a " strong " man at the helm, mean- 
ing a ruthless despot of the type of Zelaya, who maintained himself 
in power for a great many years by military tyranny, and so long as 
he prevented the people's cry of discontent from reaching the outside 
world, was given credit for preserving "peace"; and after he suc- 
ceeded in enriching himself and a favored few among the natives 
and foreigners at the expense of the people, who were kept in a con- 
dition of servitude called peonage, was praised by his sycophants 
for promoting the " prosperity " of the country. 

A different type of President is represented by Don Adolfo Diaz. 
He is a civilian of mild manner, without military training, and 
though a plain man of affairs, was called a dreamer and visionary 
because he believed in the principle that the people could be fitted by 
education to have a voice in the affairs of government rather than 
forced by violence to submit to the rule of a few. 

He not only freed Nicaragua from the corrupt Zelaya regime, 
which had fattened on the people for 17 j^^ears, but also prevented 
the infliction of an equally detestable system sought to be imposed by 
Gen. Mena, another of the " strong " type of men. Although Diaz 
was only 31 years of age when he first undertook the task of elimi- 
nating Zelaya, he had already made a name for himself as a suc- 
cessful well-to-do business man in Bluefields, on the Atlantic coast, 



32 AMEEICAN POLICY IN NICAEAGUA. 

where he first came into contact with Americans and learned ta 
admire their energy and progressive methods. He is one of the few 
Central American leaders in recent memory who, representing the 
real sentiment of those people, is fearless and outspoken in his 
friendship and admiration for the United States, though there are 
many, as the records of the department will show, who profess their 
good will, but for political reasons prefer " not to be quoted." Eeal 
friendship should be reciprocated and not penalized by us. 

Diaz's successful leadership has been a source of surprise to casual 
observers, who have seen Zelaya and the other generals like Mena 
give way in turn to a mere civilian, who has no large military fol- 
lowing but is dependent for his power on his ability and the confi- 
dence which he inspires in the people. Willing to listen patiently to 
the counsel of those around him, some of whom no doubt are self- 
seeking, he has endeavored to select the best they had to offer, though,, 
unfortunately, not alwaj^s able to counteract the worst. Yet by tact 
and perseverance he has accomplished remarkable results of a de- 
cidedly constructive character; but it must be admitted that much 
remains to be accomplished and many abuses are yet to be corrected 
before Nicaragua can be said to have recovered from the 17 years' 
blight of Zelaya. V 

Under the Diaz administration financial reorganization has pro- 
gressed in the face of adverse circumstances ; the new currency system 
has been put into effect on a sound-money, gold-exchange basis; the 
fluctuations in the unit of value, so prevalent in some of the Latin - 
American countries, and so injurious to our commerce with them» 
have been abolished, and the new standard of money, called the " Cor- 
doba," has been placed on an exact equivalent basis with the gold dol- 
lar of the United States ; a national bank, the only institution of the 
kind in the whole country, has been organized and branches opened in 
the leading cities of the Republic ; the customs have been collected with 
such efficiency that the receipts, notwithstanding the Mena disturb- 
ances, increased over all past records ; part of the public debt has been 
refunded at a more favorable rate of interest ; the tariff, which, like the 
currency, had previously differed on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, 
was revised and made uniform throughout the country; thousands of 
claims have been adjusted by the mixed-claims commission ; political 
amnesty has been granted and militarism abolished ; the army has been 
subordinated to its proper functions by the appointment as minister of 
war of a trained officer and civil engineer, who is a Nicaraguan gradu- 
ate of West Point and highly respected for his integrity and ability; 
common-school education has been extended and liberty of speech and 
press inaugurated; the railroad management has been improved to 
such an extent that the 49 per cent of the shares held by the Go\'ern- 
ment produced more revenue for the public treasury than the total 
shares under the old system, and this notwithstanding betterments 
of roadbed and installation of new rolling stock, including oil-fuel 
locomotives to replace the old, dilapidated wood-burning engines; 
and, finally, a new transcontinental railroad has been projected to 
connect Bluefields with Managua. 

To appreciate what this railroad means, it is necessary to bear in 
mind that the east and west coasts of Nicaragua, owing to differences 
of climate and physical features, are populated by different raceSj, 



AMEKICAN POLICY IlsT NICAKAGUA. 33 

having a different history, speaking a different language, professing 
a different religion, and, until recently, being governed under differ- 
ent tariff and currency systems. Bluefields has more interests, com- 
mercial and otherwise, with the United States than it has with the 
interior of Nicaragua, owing to good shipping facilities with New 
Orleans and the lack of inland communication. It is pervaded with 
a strong American influence and is free from the bitter political 
feeling that exists in the western part of the country. Diaz, who 
was for many years a resident of Bluefields, having property inter- 
ests there, believes that the construction of a transcontinental rail- 
road would bring about the unification of the Atlantic and Pacific 
sections of Nicaragua, and, by introducing new commercial interests 
as the result of direct communication with the United States, would 
tend to the development of a national spirit in place of sectionalism 
and to the lessening of the animosities which exist between Leon and 
Granada. 

The beauty and natural advantages of those two cities are sur- 
passed only by the evil of their politics and the bitterness of their 
feuds. But these very qualities are indicative of strength that is 
misdirected, and if the people, with their many admirable traits of 
character, could be brought to work in harmony they would prove 
capable of building a strong Commonwealth. It is the politicians 
who find selfish advantage in keeping alive the rancors and hatreds 
of a dead past, and their influence must be overcome by education 
and by making commerce and industry more attractive than politics. 
When the people have outgrown their narrow provincialism the two 
cities will rapidly become the largest and most prosperous in Central 
America. Construction of the transcontinental railroad would 
greatly contribute to this result, and is one of the purposes contem- 
plated by our present policy, merely awaiting the necessary funds 
that will become available with the passage of the canal treaty now 
pending in the Senate. 

It is not without significance that this treaty, originally negotiated 
by Secretary Knox, was afterwards adopted in a modified form by 
Secretary Bryan, and is now being urged by Secretary Lansing. 
Such unanimity of opinion on the merits of a measure has not 
always marked the handling of international affairs, but is quite in 
keeping with the history of the development of our policy in Nica- 
ragua, which has been consistently adhered to except in 1885, when 
President Cleveland withdrew from the consideration of the Senate 
the Frelinghuysen-ZaA^ala canal treaty, negotiated during his prede- 
cessor's administration, and even that exception related to the method 
and not to the principle, for he afterwards supported the proposed 
construction of the interoceanic waterway by American citizens under 
charter granted by act of Congress. 

The pending treaty is, therefore, in harmony with our historical 
policy, and signifies not only an option on a canal strip and the acqui- 
sition of a naval station in Fonseca Bay as a measure of preparedness 
for the protection of the Panama Canal, but also affords the means 
for the preservation of order in Nicaragua, for the peaceful develop- 
ment of its resources, unvexed by foreign interference, and for its 
attainment of a higher place in the family of American Republics. 

o 

S. Doc. 334, 64-1 3 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 

iillliiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiU 

016 000 012 O 



